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A Look At TradeKey: Shifting Policing




A woman reaches into her Chlo handbag and takes out a
Montblanc pen to sign the check as she talks animatedly with her
friend about whether to buy her father a Cartier or an A. Lange &
S6hne watch for his birthday. This is a very different scene from a
woman who grabs a pen from her purse while she talks about plans to
buy her dad a watch. The mere addition of these luxury brand names
morphs this scene from one portraying the ordinary to the
extraordinary. These names carry with them sophistication, quality,
affluence, and extravagance. Luxury brands, like these, are the
fastest growing targets for counterfeits on the web.1
The luxury brands noted above, along with Alfred Dunhill
Limited and Officine Panerai (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), were the
central parties in Chloe SAS v. Sawabeh Information Services Co.2
Plaintiffs filed suit against Sawabeh Information Services Co. and
TradeKey (collectively, "TradeKey") for facilitating the sale of
counterfeit versions of their products. 3 This is the first case that has
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2015: B.A.,
Philosophy & Psychology, University of San Diego, 2012. The author thanks the Hastings
Business Law Journal editorial board for their hard work on this note. It has been a pleasure
working with all of you. The author also thanks her family and friends for all of their love and
support.
1. Maura Kutner, The Ftht A gainst Fakes Online, HARPER'S BAZAAR (Dec. 14, 2010),
http://www.harpersbazaar.com/fashion/fashion-articles/fight-against-fakes-online -0111.
2. Chloe SAS v. Sawabeh Information Services Co., No. CV 11-4147 GAF (MANx), 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187398, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2013).
3. Id. at *2.
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held an online marketplace liable for contributory counterfeiting 4 -a
huge victory for the brand owners.5 This is a notable departure from
Tiffany v. eBay, in which the Second Circuit held that eBay's anti-
counterfeiting policy and responsiveness to specific complaints
released them from contributory counterfeiting liability.6 TradeKey
was still held liable despite its intellectual property rights policy and
notice-and-takedown procedures Furthermore, the injunction
shifted some of the trademark policing burdens from trademark
owner to the third party website.8
This note addresses contributory counterfeiting within online
marketplaces. Contributory counterfeiting arises when a party
materially contributes to, facilitates, induces, or is otherwise
responsible for the direct counterfeiting carried out by a third party.
This note argues that online marketplaces should be required to take
a more active role in combating counterfeiting through their
platforms. This note proceeds in five parts. Part I serves as an
introduction to the issue. Part II provides background information
regarding trademark counterfeiting and gives an overview of the case
law regarding contributory counterfeiting in online marketplaces.
Part III looks at the implications of the TradeKey case for brands,
online marketplaces, sellers, and consumers. Part IV proposes
mechanisms that an online marketplace could enact to police
trademark infringement effectively. Part V concludes that TradeKey
decision has taken a step in the right direction as online marketplaces
should take a more proactive role in policing their own websites.
4. Dean Takahashi, How an Undercover Agent Busted One of the Biggeest Counterfeiters
Online, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 15, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2013/10/15/how-an-
undercover-man-busted-tradekey-commerce-site-for-selling-counterfeit-goods/view-all/.
5. Luxury Brands Celebrate Counterfeit Victori; WORLD INTELL. PROP. REV. (Oct. 15,
2013), http://www.worldipreview. com/news/luxury-brands-celebrate-counterfeiting-victory.
6. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010).
7. Charlotte Marie Petilla, Naming Your Sales Division 'Replica Products" is Never a
Good Idea or How Not to Facilitate Counterfeiters, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. BLOG
(Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.trademarkandcopyrightlawblog.com/2013/11/naming-your-sales-
division-replica-products-is-never-a-good-idea-or-how-not-to-facilitate-counterfeiters/.
8. Chloe SAS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187398, at *12-13.
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II. BACKGROUND
The use of identifying marks on goods is a longstanding practice.9
Originally used to indicate ownership, the marks later came to serve
as the identifier for the source of the goods with the development of
commercial trade.10 Similarly, trademark counterfeiting is not a new
phenomenon. In fact, the oldest counterfeit products -stoppers
used to seal amphorae filled with wine-date from around 200 B.C.
and are currently on display at the Museum of Counterfeiting.' The
counterfeiting of goods may seem like a victimless crime, where no
one is harmed by the sale of imitation goods sold at significantly
lower prices than brand name products. However, counterfeiting
costs U.S. businesses more than two hundred billion dollars each year
and accounts for the loss of more than 750,000 jobs.13
A. OVERVIEW OF CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING
The Lanham Act is the source of federal trademark law in the
United States.1 4  Under the Lanham Act, direct trademark
infringement occurs when someone uses another firm's mark
commercially without permission and causes a likelihood of confusion
as to the source of the goods or services. 15  Injunctive relief is the
9. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 9 cmt. B (1995).
10. Id
11. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REPORT: BRANDS - REPUTATION AND IMAGE IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 88
(2013), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/944/wipo-pub 944
2013.pdf.
12. Id
13. ERWIN A. BLACKSTONE, JOSEPH P. FUHR JR. & STEVE POCIASK, AM. CONSUMER
INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FACTS AND CONSUMER OPINIONS ON COUNTERFEIT AND
PIRATED GOODS (July 25, 2013), available at http://www.theamericanconsumer.org/wp-
content/uploads/ 2013/07/Final-IP-Studv-w-Cover.pdf.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72, 1091-96, 1111-27, 1141-41n (2010).
15. See id. § 1125(a)(1)(A). To prove infringement in cases where the mark used by the
defendant is not identical, the court will consider an array of factors, including: similarity of the
marks, proximity of the goods or services, evidence of actual confusion, defendant's intent,
strength of the plaintiff's mark, likelihood of bridging the gap, consumer sophistication, and
marketing channels used by the parties. See AME, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-
49 (9th Cir. 1979); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Flees. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1963).
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primary remedy for infringement, 1 though actual damages, lost
profits, and costs are also recoverable.17
Trademark counterfeiting is direct infringement that results
when one party uses a counterfeit mark identical to the mark owned
by a second party on the same type of goods and sells those goods in
direct competition with that second party. 8 The Lanham Act defines
a counterfeit mark as an imitation mark that is identical to, or
substantially indistinguishable from, a mark that is in use and
registered. 9 Counterfeit goods defraud consumers who believe that
they have purchased genuine goods. 0
The conditions for imposing liability on those who are not direct
infringers are not defined in the Lanham Act. Rather, indirect or
secondary liability for trademark infringement is a judicially created
doctrine that has been imported from the common law of torts.2
According to principles of indirect tort liability, "one is subject to
liability if he permits [a third person] to act with his instrumentalities,
knowing or having reason to know that the other is acting or will act
tortiously . '
There are two ways to prove secondary trademark liability:
vicarious infringement and contributory infringement. Vicarious
infringement arises when there is an agency or similar type of
relationship between the defendant and the direct infringer, or when
the defendant and direct infringer jointly own or control the means of
infringement. 3  The second type of liability, contributory
infringement, has been at the heart of the TradeKey dispute, as well
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a).
17. Id. § 1117(a).
18. Id. § 1114(1)(b). The Lanham Act authorizes seizure of any counterfeit goods or marks.
Id. § 1116(d)(4)(B).
19. Id. § 1116(d)(1)(B).
20. See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc'ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 94-95 (2d Cir. 2001).
21. SeeHard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148 (7th
Cir. 1992). Citing the Restatement of Torts, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that a third party "is
responsible for the torts of those it permits on its premises 'knowing or having reason to know
that the other is acting or will act tortuously .' Id. at 1149.
22. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 877(c) cmt. d (1979).
23. See David Berg & Co. v. Gatto Int'l Trading Co., 884 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that vicarious infringement occurs when a party is in privity with the direct
infringer); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that
vicarious liability requires a finding of a partnership or agency relationship); see also MARY
LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 257-60 (2d ed. 2009).
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as a separate dispute between Tiffany Inc. ("Tiffany") and eBay Inc.
("eBay"). Liability for contributory infringement arises when the
defendant either actively induces another to directly infringe the
plaintiff's trademark, or continues to supply a product to another who
is directly infringing the plaintiff's trademark. 4
B. THE INWOOD TEST FOR CONTRIBUTORY COUNTERFEITING
The U.S. Supreme Court enumerated the test for secondary
trademark infringement in Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, IncY In
Inwood, the Court held drug manufacturers contributorily liable
when pharmacists intentionally mislabeled generic drugs as brand
name drugs in order to deceive customers. 6 The opinion created the
Inwood test, which provides that a manufacturer or distributor is
responsible for any harm done as a result of direct trademark
infringement if he: (1) "intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark," or (2) "continues to supply its product to one whom it
knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement."2'
The courts developed the Inwood test over the following years.
In Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., the
Seventh Circuit held that the Inwood standard applies to those that
provide services to direct infringers rather than just applying to
manufacturers and distributors28 The court concluded that a flea
market operator could be liable for secondary trademark
infringement because the operator promoted, advertised, and
supervised the market, as well as profited from ticket sales.
The Ninth Circuit, in Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction Inc.,
reached a similar conclusion under similar circumstances, holding that
"a swap meet [operator] cannot disregard its vendors' blatant
24. See Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 854-55 (1982).
25. Id. at 854.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. HardRock Cafe Licensing, 955 F.2d at 1149.
29. Id. at 1148-49. The court ultimately decided that, in this instance, the flea market
operator was not liable for secondary trademark infringement in this case, but made clear that
liability was possible depending on the facts of the particular case.
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trademark infringements with impunity., 30 The court in Fonovisa
agreed with the Hard Rock Cafe decision, holding that Inwood "laid
down no limiting principle that would require [a] defendant to be a
manufacturer or distributor" in order to impose secondary trademark
infringement liability.31
The Ninth Circuit extended this rationale to the Internet context
in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., holding that
online service providers can be held liable for secondary trademark
infringement under Inwood depending on "the extent of control
exercised by the defendant over the third party's means of
infringement.",32 If the online venue has "direct control and
monitoring" over a third party's use of the site to infringe trademarks,
then this satisfies the Inwood "supplies a product" requirement for
contributory infringement.33
This line of cases leads directly to the application of the Inwood
test to online marketplaces. Online marketplaces are the Internet
equivalent of flea markets or swap meets. They serve the same
purpose: a platform for third parties to sell their goods, some of which
may potentially be counterfeit goods. Thus, the same rule regarding
counterfeit goods applies.
C. COUNTERFEIT GOODS AND TIE ONLINE MARKETPLACE
Tiffany, a luxury brand jewelry retailer and the owner of multiple
trademarks for high quality luxury goods, brought one of the first
cases that looked specifically at contributory counterfeiting in online
marketplaces when it took action against the online auction site,
eBay.34  eBay served as an online platform through which third
parties sold counterfeit Tiffany-branded merchandise. 3  The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York entered
30. Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996).
31. Id.
32. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999).
33. Id.
34. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
35. Id.
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judgment in favor of eBay with respect to the claims of trademark
infringement, 6 which was later affirmed by the Second Circuit.
Tiffany claimed that eBay was infringing on its trademarks
because "thousands of counterfeit [Tiffany] jewelry items were
offered for sale on eBay's [website]., 38 eBay did not contest Tiffany's
right to the mark or that counterfeit items were being sold via its
online auction site. 39 The question at issue in this case was whether
eBay had the burden of policing Tiffany's trademarks, and if so,
whether eBay met that burden. 40 The district court concluded that
Tiffany failed to carry its burden with respect to its claims and held
that "Tiffany must ultimately bear the burden of protecting its
trademark. 4 1
The district court held that eBay was not liable for contributory
infringement because eBay's use of Tiffany's trademarks on its
website, advertising, and sponsored links on search engines was a
"protected, nominative fair use" of the marks.42 The court noted that
"when Tiffany put eBay on notice of specific [infringing] items ...
eBay immediately removed those listings." 43 Because in cases where
"eBay possessed the requisite knowledge [of the counterfeiting], it
took appropriate steps to remove listings and suspend service," the
district court found no liability for eBay.44
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed judgment in favor
of eBay with respect to the claims of trademark infringement. 4  This
case is significant because it is one of the first appellate courts in the
U.S. to address the issue of contributory trademark infringement in
an online marketplace.46 The Second Circuit acknowledged the
36. Tiffani, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
37. Tiffain, 600 F.3d at 114.
38. Id. at 1(2.
39. Tfina;, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
40. Id. at 469-70.
41. Id. at 470.
42. Tiffani, 600 F.3d at 113 (quoting Titain, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 520).
43. Tiffani, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
44. Id. at 470.
45. Tiffain, 600 F.3d at 114.
46. The Second Circuit notes that they have "addressed contributory trademark
infringement in only two related decisions, and even then in little detail." Id. at 105 (citing
Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 975 F.2d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1992); Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran,
37 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 1994)).
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precedent for contributory liability where a distributor induces
another to infringe or knowingly supplies an infringing property but
noted, "the limited case law leaves the law of contributory trademark
infringement ill-defined .... We are apparently the first [court] to
consider its application to an online marketplace."47 European courts
had previously addressed the issue in a similar context, but with
varied results.48 The Belgian court found no liability on the part of
eBay for "counterfeit products sold through its website., 49  French
courts went the other way, finding eBay liable for trademark
infringement in circumstances factually similar to both the Belgian
case and the Tiffany case. 0 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
noted:
We agree with the district court. For contributory trademark
infringement liability to lie, a service provider must have more than
a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used
to sell counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which
particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is
51necessary.
Applying the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the Inwoodtest
and agreeing with the district court, the Second Circuit observed that
"Tiffany's general allegations of counterfeiting failed to provide eBay
with the knowledge required under Inwood.,52 In order to find eBay
liable, Tiffany's demand letters would have had to be more specific as
to which sellers in particular were passing counterfeit goods.53 The
buyers' complaints that eBay received were also insufficient to
establish the requisite knowledge because they complained that
"listings were removed and [sellers that were] repeat offenders were
suspended from the eBay site., 54
47. Tiffan, 600 F.3d at 105 (quoting PolImer, 975 F.2d at 64) (citing Lockheed Mlartin
Corp., 194 F.3d at 984-85).
48. Tiffan, 600 F.3d at 105 n.9.
49. Id. (citing Lancome Parfums et Beaute v. eBay Int'l AG, Tribunal de Commerce
[Comm.] [Commerce Tribunal] Brussels, July 31, 2008, A/07/06032).
50. See id. (referencing two French cases).
51. Tiffani, 600 F.3d at 107.
52. Id. at 109 (quoting Tfiani, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 511); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439, 489 (1984) (interpreting the knowledge standard
set forth in InwoodLabs., 456 U.S. 844).
53. Id. at 109 (citing Tithain, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 511-13).
54. Id.
Vol. 11:2
A LOOK AT TRADEKEY
The Second Circuit also addressed whether there was any
liability for contributory infringement. As noted above, the
principle of contributory infringement places liability on a
manufacturer or distributor that knows or has reason to know that
another is participating in trademark infringement and continues to
supply the infringer despite knowledge of its infringement.5 6 Courts
have expanded and applied this doctrine to suppliers of services, but
prior to this case, have not applied it to a provider of an online
marketplace. 7
A service provider, such as eBay, can engage in contributory
trademark infringement in two ways.58 The service provider may
either (1) "intentionally induce another to infringe a trademark" or
(2) "continue to supply [the] service" even though it is aware of the
third party's infringement. s9 The facts of this case indicated the need
to examine only the second portion of this test.60 Both the district
court and the Second Circuit agreed that there could be no liability
for the infringing listings on the eBay site that Tiffany identified and
eBay took down.61
Tiffany was aware of evidence of other sales of counterfeit goods
on the eBay website and sent demand letters to eBay regarding that
evidence. However, the demand letters were not sufficiently specific
to provide eBay with more than general knowledge that there had
been some illicit sales through their online marketplace. 62 Thus,
Tiffany did not establish that eBay necessarily continued to provide
services to individuals who were using the site to make illegal sales.63
Tiffany's claim could not stand because they failed to put eBay on
notice of specific sales by specific individuals. 64 Accordingly, the rule
going forward is that a service provider of online services must be
aware of particular listings that were infringing or would infringe in
55. Tiffani, 600 F.3d at 103.
56. Id. at 104.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 106.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 107-08.
61. Tiffani, 600 F.3d at 114-15; Tiffani; 576 F. Supp. 2d at 526-27.
62. Tiffani, 600 F.3d at 106.
63. See id. at 113.
64. See id. at 107.
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order to be liable for contributory infringement.6 Thus, rather than a
general prohibition on the continued sale of goods bearing a
trademark, the contributory infringement test applies to specific sales
or individuals who infringe the mark.66
Tiffany also argued that eBay had been willfully blind to the fact
that there were several counterfeit listings on its website. 67 However,
the record reflected that eBay had taken several measures of its own
volition and expense to stop potential counterfeiters.68 In addition,
eBay had incentives to stop the counterfeit goods, including
maintaining its reputation among consumers. 69  Had eB ay been
willfully blind, it could have been charged with knowledge under the
Inwoodtest for contributory infringement.7 0 Thus, the Second Circuit
made clear that a service provider, including an online marketplace, is
not allowed to turn a blind eye and ignore potentially infringing
websites once those websites are brought to its attention.71
The Second Circuit has reinforced that it is the responsibility of
the trademark owner to police and maintain its marksi-' The
trademark owner cannot rely on the efforts of a service provider to
protect its goodwill.73 However, service providers must work with
trademark owners to ensure that counterfeit goods are not being sold
on their sites. When service providers become aware of potentially
infringing activity, they must do everything they can to stop the
activity. 4 If service providers are made aware of specific activity and
fail to act, they may be liable for contributory trademark
infringement.7
65. Tiffani, 600 F.3d at 108.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 109-10.
68. Id. at 98, 109.
69. eBay has an interest in being a safe place to do business. For example, if fraud becomes
a rampant problem, eBay may have difficulty maintaining their customer base. They may drive
consumers to seek out other retailers who are offering verified products without the risk of
purchasing counterfeit goods. Id at 98 (citing Titain, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469).
70. Tiffani, 600 F.3d at 110 (citing InwoodLabs., 456 U.S. 844).
71. See Tiffani, 600 F.3d at 109-10.
72. See id. at 106-10.
73. See id. at 106-07.
74. See id. at 109.
75. Id.
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D. NEW DEVELOPMENTS WITH THE TRADEKEYCASE
1. Overview of the Case
Several luxury brand owners and associated trademarks sued
TradeKey, a group of offshore internet companies that promoted and
facilitated the sale of counterfeit versions of trademarked goods
through their websites.76 The District Court for the Central District
of California granted partial summary judgment against TradeKey on
claims of contributory counterfeiting.77
Similar to eBay, TradeKey does not directly sell goods itself.
Instead, TradeKey provides an online marketplace through which
vendors can market their goods.78 The sale of counterfeit goods is a
large component of TradeKey's business.7 9 In fact, TradeKey had
both a "Replica Products" and a "Replica Retention" division in their
sales department.8 0 TradeKey did not make money by taking a
percentage of the transactions processed through the site.81 Instead,
TradeKey made revenue from charging for premium memberships.
Furthermore, TradeKey directly solicited wholesale counterfeit
buyers and distributors to become paying premium members.8 -
Plaintiffs hired private investigator Rob Holmes ("Holmes") to
investigate possible counterfeiting through use of the TradeKey
platform83  Holmes opened a free account and began making
purchases to build up his reputation on the site.84 Holmes then
purchased a premium membership after which he was contacted by a
TradeKey employee, Farooq Khalil ("Khalil").85 Khalil gave Holmes
tips on how to market products on the site and how to sell counterfeit
goods.8 6 Additionally, TradeKey removed the word "replica" from
76. Chloe SAS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187398, at *1.
77. Id.
78. Id. at *8.
79. Id. at *3.
80. Id.




85. Chloe SAS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187398, at *3.
86. Id.
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Holmes' advertisements in a clear attempt to hide its counterfeit
nature.8 Holmes found over six thousand sellers offering branded
products on TradeKey. This included over 2,400 sellers for Chloe-
branded goods, two hundred sellers of Dunhill-branded goods, 850
sellers of Panerai branded goods, 500 sellers of Mont Blanc-branded
goods, and 1,900 sellers of Cartier branded goods.' These sellers
were not authorized by the Plaintiffs to sell genuine goods.8 9 Holmes
also purchased products that were confirmed as counterfeits. 9
In order to prevail on a contributory counterfeiting claim, a
plaintiff must establish the underlying direct counterfeiting. 91 Direct
counterfeiting is established by demonstrating (1) ownership of a
valid trademark, and (2) a defendant's unauthorized use of that
trademark in connection with the sale of goods that is likely to
confuse consumers." There is no dispute over whether the Plaintiffs
owned a valid and protectable trademark registration for their
respective marks.93  TradeKey challenged the sufficiency and
credibility of the evidence that TradeKey members were selling
counterfeit versions of the Plaintiffs' products. 94  However, the
District Court for the Central District of California concluded that
TradeKey failed to present any persuasive arguments that showed
doubt in the evidence. 95 Accordingly, the court concluded that the
Plaintiffs established direct counterfeiting by TradeKey members. 96
Since the underlying direct counterfeiting was established, the
Plaintiffs had to demonstrate that TradeKey continued to allow the
use of their services to those they knew or had reason to know were
engaging in trademark infringement. 97  Additionally, because
TradeKey provided a service, the Plaintiffs also had to establish that
87. Chloe SAS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187398, at *3.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *4.
91. Id. at *5 (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Akanoc Solutions, 658 F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir.
2011)).
92. Id. (citing Gucci Am. Inc. v. Pieta, No. CV 04-9626, 2006 WL 4725706, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 23, 2006)).
93. Id. at *5.
94. Id.
95. Id. at *7.
96. Id. at *8.
97. Id. at *9.
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TradeKey had "direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality
used by the third party to infringe" the marks. 98 The court found that
the Plaintiffs conclusively demonstrated these elements. 99 TradeKey
clearly had knowledge of the use of TradeKey as a platform to sell
counterfeit goods as they actively maintained "Replica Products" and
"Replica Retention" sales divisions. 00 Furthermore, during Holmes'
investigation, a TradeKey employee told him that there was no issue
with selling counterfeit luxury goods as the sale of such goods was
actually a lot of revenue for TradeKey.01  In terms of control,
TradeKey "monitors and controls every aspect of its website and all
member listings. -"" TradeKey does not allow members to change
listings; additionally, TradeKey will choose and add keywords for
premium members to optimize the search of these listings.0 3 The
court once again concluded that TradeKey failed to offer any
persuasive response to the Plaintiffs' arguments.10 4 Accordingly, the
court granted the motion for summary judgment with respect to their
claim for contributory counterfeiting.
2. A Landmark Injunction
The court granted the Plaintiffs' request for an incredibly broad
permanent injunction. TradeKey was enjoined from (1) permitting,
allowing or facilitating customers to buy, sell, manufacture, or
distribute trademarked products; (2) displaying listings that use any of
the Plaintiffs' marks or as a response to the use of a search term; (3)
using the Plaintiffs' marks as keywords, ad-words, or any other type
of metadata; and (4) allowing or advising any person how to create or
post listings for infringing products.'' The injunction also required
that TradeKey institute mechanisms to ensure compliance with the
injunction and provide the court written confirmation of their
98. Chloe SAS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187398, at *9 (quoting Lockheed lartin Corp., 194
F.3d at 980, 984).
99. Id. at *9.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *9-10.
102. Id. at *10.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at * 12.
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compliance.10 6 TradeKey must take down or disable any listing upon
receiving written notice that is it infringing or if it otherwise comes to
the attention of TradeKey that it is infringing. 7 Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, TradeKey is required to monitor their websites on
an on-going basis "to confirm each website is in compliance with this
Order." 08
III. IMPLICATIONS OF TRADEKEY
A. IMPACT ON BRANDS
The TradeKey decision required the online marketplace to take
on a more proactive role in the policing of trademarks. This relieved
the trademark holders from some of those policing burdens. The
previous standard set by the Tiffany case was insufficient for
protecting trademark holders. While it did provide that websites
needed to take some measures with regard to trademarks, it focused
on the reactive measures, such as prompt responses to report and
takedowns notices. This required trademark holders to actively
police the site in search of counterfeits to report before anything
would be done about the listings. Report and takedown systems are
not sufficient to protect trademark holders and do not function well
in online marketplaces because the counterfeit goods are often sold
before such notices could even be processed. TradeKey moves from
a reactive to proactive measure. This lightens some of the burdens of
policing and engenders a team effort between online marketplaces
and trademark holders.
B. IMPACT ON ONLINE MARKETPLACES
Online marketplaces will now have to take on a greater burden
when it comes to policing trademarks. They can no longer remain in
the safe harbor of only passively responding to takedown requests
when they know that their website is being used by third parties for
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counterfeiting. Additionally, since most online marketplaces already
have takedown systems in place, it is evident that they presently have
the ability to police and will not have to undergo complete
restructuring and development. Resources within the business will
simply have to be shifted. If the online marketplace is curbing
counterfeiting itself, it will be dealing with less takedown notices.
Online marketplaces can shift the resources previously used to deal
with the takedown notices to take a more proactive approach
regarding trademark infringement. There will still be a takedown
notice system as the online marketplace may miss some, but this will
drastically decrease the quantity with which they are dealing.
Additionally, if online marketplaces have such policies in place, they
will likely gain more trust from consumers to provide genuine goods.
C. IMPACT ON SELLERS
The injunction in TradeKey may have a negative effect on
legitimate sellers of goods as it prevents them from using the
trademark in their listing, in their advertising, or as a search term.
This is extremely negative as it prevents them from accurately
advertising a legitimate good. However, in TradeKey, there were not
many, if any, legitimate sellers to take into consideration. The
injunction set out in TradeKey places a significant barrier against
counterfeit sellers. The new policies would make it more difficult to
sell counterfeit goods. For instance, if counterfeiters lose the major
platform through which they engage in selling counterfeit goods, this
will have a curbing effect on illegal activity.
D. IMPACT ON CONSUMERS
The TradeKey decision will have a positive impact on consumers
that are looking for genuine goods since it will make it more difficult
to list counterfeit products on online marketplaces. While it may
restrict consumer access to the cheaper counterfeit goods, consumers
should not be able to benefit from an illegal activity. If consumers
want to buy cheaper non-brand products, they can buy non-branded
products rather than counterfeit goods.
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IV. PROPOSAL
A. SUMMARY OF TIE PROBLEM
Online marketplaces have become the choice platform for
counterfeiters to sell their goods. Through use of the Internet, the
counterfeiter now has access to a worldwide marketplace without the
costs of keeping up a brick-and-motar storefront. Furthermore, the
Internet allows anonymity to the benefit of the counterfeiter. After
the Tiffany case, the online marketplace has been able to remove
itself from liability in third party contributory counterfeiting by
keeping minimum reactive policies to counter trademark
infringement. However, with the speed at which these transactions of
counterfeit goods occur, the current standards remain insufficient to
address the issue before the goods are sold and pass through the
system. TradeKeytakes a step towards more stringent treatment with
regard to online marketplaces and their responsibilities to actively
police counterfeits within their websites.
B. ONLINE MARKETPLACES SHOULD TAKE A MORE PROACTIVE
ROLE AGAINST COUNTERFEITING
Given the rise in technology and the pervasiveness of the
Internet, the online marketplace has become a staple in today's
world. It has essentially become the equivalent of the mortar-and-
brick storefronts of the past. Similar to the Fono visa and Hard Rock
Gafd cases, those managing the storefront have a responsibility over
those that use them as the platform to sell their goods. They cannot
turn a blind eye to the activity that they are facilitating and should not
be able to disregard their vendors' blatant trademark infringements.
The Tiffany case has allowed online marketplaces to take unfair
advantage of the safe harbor and facilitate third party counterfeiting.
It allowed the marketplace to avoid liability if it had reactive
measures in place, specifically the notice and takedown system. The
online marketplaces should be required to do more so that they
cannot benefit from the illegal activity of their users.
The TradeKey injunction leaves open a broad category of
institutional mechanisms to ensure compliance with the injunction
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beyond the current report and takedown notice system. The court
does not give clear instructions on the kinds of mechanisms that
would be sufficient to comply with this portion of the injunction. The
following are some ways in which an online marketplace could
comply.
The online marketplace can shift resources to retain the services
of private investigators to study and follow suspicious sales practices
by users. These private investigators, much like Holmes, could
monitor listings for items that are likely to be counterfeit by looking
at factors such as a suspicious item's brand name (i.e., a commonly
counterfeited famous mark), the quantity sold, the pricing of the item,
and the description and/or visual representation of the item. The key
is to assign knowledgeable individuals to the task of uncovering
possible counterfeits instead of continuing the current practices of
assigning to the issue a large group of employees who are
inexperienced in detecting the signs of counterfeit activity. This
simple change in the composition of the trademark protection team
would diminish cases of legitimate sales being suspended due to the
erroneous belief that they may be illicit, result in more counterfeit
items being pulled from the site in shorter periods of time, and
provide a direct, informed point of contact for trademark owners.
This would facilitate communication between trademark holders and
online marketplaces in a more efficient and cooperative. Likewise,
trademark holders likely would invest in keeping the online
marketplaces' investigators up to date on their latest products and
designs by issuing informational documents or even making
presentations to the team from time to time.
With respect to repeat offenders, a business can monitor
suspicious users and users who have previously either completed
illicit transactions or offered fake goods for sale. Accordingly, the
online marketplace would be able to develop its list of "high risk"
users and monitor them effectively. If a user is found to be a repeat
offender, the user could be temporarily suspended from selling any
products or permanently banned from selling that brand of goods
again. At that point, the seller would also be deemed "high risk," and
his activities on the site would warrant closer monitoring. If the seller
is again caught selling counterfeit items of any nature or brand, he
would be banned from having an account on the site. In this system, a
Summer 2015
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
user would still have the opportunity to challenge each action taken
against him, but in the event that he is found to have knowingly
offered or sold counterfeit items, he would have only one remaining
opportunity to use his account lawfully.
Users who are initially investigated but later cleared should be
able to continue using the services, and their publicly viewable
records should not mention such investigations. Likewise, users who
have already been suspended for selling counterfeit goods and are in
the "high risk" group should have details of their temporary
suspension and permanent ban (from selling certain items) on their
publicly viewable records so that potential buyers are aware of their
illicit activity. This would not only aid buyers when they are deciding
between sellers for a particular item, but also help decrease the
amount of customer complaints regarding fake items received in lieu
of authentic items and ensuing money refund claims.
To ensure that banned users do not come back to the site under
another username, the online marketplace should keep an updated
list of every banned member and their IP addresses. While a user
may choose to remain anonymous to other members on the site, the
online marketplace should ensure that sellers cannot remain
anonymous after registration. In addition to keeping a database with
banned IP addresses, the site should revise its registration procedure
by requiring that every user also sign up for a PayPal account or other
similar service. This way, users would have to provide a valid Social
Security number and valid bank account or credit card, which would
make it more difficult to create a new fake account once an account
has been banned.
V. CONCLUSION
The TradeKey decision is a clear step in the right direction in
terms of regulating contributory counterfeiting within the online
marketplace as it lays out a stricter standard for online marketplaces
and their role of preventing contributory counterfeiting. Online
marketplaces should not be able to escape liability when it comes to
facilitating third party counterfeiting. In fact, they should be taking a
proactive role in the fight against it. Online marketplaces have the
ability to exercise control over their users and should not be able to
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profit from users' illicit activity. With trademark holders working
together with the online marketplaces to curtail the counterfeit
industry, there will likely be a decrease in the ability of counterfeits to
thrive as they have been able to under the current system.
360 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 11:2
